Preemption between the Poles: ERISA\u27s Effect on State Common Law Actions Other Than Benefit Claims by Price, Troy A.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 19 Issue 4 Article 2 
1997 
Preemption between the Poles: ERISA's Effect on State Common 
Law Actions Other Than Benefit Claims 
Troy A. Price 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Retirement Security Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Troy A. Price, Preemption between the Poles: ERISA's Effect on State Common Law Actions Other Than 
Benefit Claims, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 541 (1997). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
PREEMPTION "BETWEEN THE POLES:" ERISA'S EFFECT ON
STATE COMMON LAW ACTIONS OTHER THAN BENEFIT CLAIMS
Troy A. Price*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the decade since Pilot Life Insurance Company v. Dedeaux' and
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Taylor,2 the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)3 has swept with extraordinary force4
across the field of state common laws regulating relationships between those
who seek to collect health, life, disability, or other job-related benefits and
those who either sponsor such benefits or play some role in deciding benefit
claims. Congress charted the preemptive effect of this federal law on the basis
of a functional landmark, the employee benefit plan.5 When a claim for
benefits is a part of an employee welfare benefit plan6 or pension plan,7 it arises
* Mr. Price is a graduate of the University at Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law
(J.D., with honors, 1987) and Arkansas State University (B.S. 1981). He is a partner in the
Wright Lindsey & Jennings law firm in Little Rock, where he principally practices in the areas
of employee benefit litigation and appellate matters. The author wishes to express sincere
appreciation to Nancy Bellhouse May for her comments during the preparation of this article.
1. 481 U.S. 41 (1987). The Court held that ERISA preempted an employee's breach of
contract and tort claims against the insurance company that issued his employer's group
disability policy. Id. The opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor acknowledged that a
framework for preemption decisions had by then emerged, and that one of its essential features
was the breadth of the preemption language in the statute. Id.
2. 481 U.S. 58 (1987). Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion holding that plaintiff's
contract and wrongful termination claims arising from a disability dispute not only were
preempted, but were completely displaced by ERISA remedies so as to authorize removal of
a well-pleaded complaint in which only state claims were raised. Id.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
4. In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court described ERISA as having "unique
preemptive force" as well as such "extraordinary" power as to convert purported state law
claims into claims that necessarily are federal in character. 481 U.S. at 64-65 (comparing sweep
of ERISA preemption to that under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),
29 U.S.C. § 185, by which any suit alleging violation of a contract between an employer and
a labor union is purely a creature of federal law, despite the fact that state law would otherwise
provide a cause of action).
5. As used in ERISA, "[t]he term 'employee benefit plan' or 'plan' means an employee
welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(3).
6. ERISA § 3(1) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1)The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan,
fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by
an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such
plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing
for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event
of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits,
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exclusively under ERISA - which displaces all state law rights and remedies
in favor of the comprehensive federal mechanism for defining8 and enforcing
rights.9
The contours of preemption are not as well defined with respect to laws
that affect common law actions other than those by which plan participants or
beneficiaries seek benefits under plans sponsored by employers. In such cases,
mapping the boundaries of the prerogatives reserved to the states in their
historic areas of concern has required closer scrutiny of the extent to which the
state law "relate[s] to" an employee welfare benefit plan.'0 Generally, when a
state common law cause of action merely has some incidental effect, tenuous
connection, or minor reference to such a plan, the state law survives; "run-of-
the-mill state law claims such as unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even
torts committed by ERISA plans . . . although obviously affecting and
involving ERISA plans and their trustees, are not preempted by ERISA."'
apprenticeship or other training pr6grams, or day care centers, scholarship funds or
prepaid legal services ....
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
7. Section 3(2)(A) of ERISA provides as follows:
[Except as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe certain exemptions,] the terms
"employee pension benefit plan" and "pension plan" mean any plan, fund, or
program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its
express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or
program--
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending
to the termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the
method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method
of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing
benefits from the plan.
Id. § 1002(2)(A).
8. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11 th Cir. 1982) ("Broadly
stated, ERISA established minimum standards for vesting of benefits, funding of benefits,
carrying out fiduciary responsibilities, reporting to the government and making disclosures to
participants.") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639).
9. This is so because "[t]he policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies
and the exclusion of others would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and
beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA."
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.
10. See ERISA § 514, which provides as follows:
(a) Supersedure; effective date. Except as provided [by exceptions set out in the
statute], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan described [by the statute].
29 U.S.C. § 1 144(a). State laws include "laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State
action having the effect of law." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1).
11. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv. Co., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) (ERISA did
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When the action adjusts relationships between ERISA entities,12 or draws on
the benefit plan as a source of rights, preemption usually applies. 3
"Between the poles of those laws that clearly 'relate to' an ERISA plan
and those that are clearly too tenuously related are a host of state laws that pose
more difficult questions of preemption., 14 This article surveys preemption in
this gray area. It includes an overview of ERISA litigation, which is necessary
to an appreciation of the effect of preemption in destroying state law causes of
action as well as in displacing them with federal remedies.' 5 It also suggests
that, because of a seemingly heightened focus on the distinction between
"super" or "complete" preemption and ordinary preemption, state courts may
play a growing role in defining the limits of preemption. Focusing on the
Eighth Circuit, the article notes the emergence of a multi-factor test 6 that
not preempt state's general garnishment statute, despite its effect on plan participants; however,
state law that singled out ERISA plans for protective treatment as to garnishment had
sufficiently strong reference to plan as to be preempted); see Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1 (1987) (no preemption of state law requiring one time payment of severance
benefits, since the law did not require or establish a benefit plan, an essential element of which
would be an ongoing administrative program to meet the employer's obligation).
12. See, e.g., In re Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 857 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1988) (Missouri statute
creating damages for an insurance company's vexatious refusal to pay disability benefits was
completely preempted by ERISA).
13. Within the sphere of benefit determinations and enforcement of rights stemming from
benefit plans, Congress chose a "closely integrated regulatory system" marked by "various
safeguards to preclude abuse and 'to completely secure the rights and expectations brought into
being by this landmark reform legislation."' Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,
137 (1990) (quoting S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4872). Thus, in Ingersoll-Rand, a former employee's state law claim that
he was fired so that the employer could avoid contributing to his pension fund was held
preempted, as it would have required proof that an ERISA plan existed and that the employer
was motivated to avoid the terms of the plan. Id. at 140. Otherwise, the Court reasoned,
various states might exercise their power to develop different common law standards applicable
to the same employer conduct. Id. at 142. Inefficiencies arising from conflicting burdens might
work to the detriment of beneficiaries. Id.
14. Bannister v. Sorenson, 103 F.3d 632, 635 (8th Cir. 1996).
15. At least in the Eighth Circuit, when a state law claim is preempted, the district court
should examine the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated under
ERISA. Slice v. Sons of Norway, 978 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1992) (Slice 1).
16. See, e.g., Bannister, 103 F.3d at 635 (setting forth six factors for determining ERISA
preemption: (1) whether the state law negates a plan provision; (2) the effect on primary ERISA
entities; (3) the impact on plan administration; (4) the economic impact on the plan; (5) whether
preemption is consistent with other provisions of ERISA; and (6) whether the state law at issue
is an exercise of traditional state power). The factors were initially outlined by the Eighth
Circuit in the context of a challenge to state legislation. See Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Boyle v.
Anderson, 68 1093, 1101-1110 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1266 (1996) (applying
factors to state health provider tax). In Bannister, the Eighth Circuit adopted this test for
application in "both the common law and statutory environment." Bannister, 103 F. 3d at 635.
1997]
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should supply a measure of predictability and regularity 7 to preemption
analysis in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent characterization of the
once-venerated "relates to" test as merely "unhelpful."'" Finally, the article
examines the way some courts have resolved preemption issues arising from
actions falling between the realm of benefit claims (whether of the direct or
disguised variety) that are plainly preempted, and that of state common law
claims that scarcely have anything to do with employee benefit plans.
The effect of ERISA preemption on state legislation is a subject of great
interest and speculation, ripe for further clarification on the basis of signals
from the Supreme Court.1 9 That topic, however, is beyond the scope of this
article. The virtually infinite permutations of possible state legislation bearing
on health care and health care providers assures that preemption litigation will
continue in that arena for some time, with each new Supreme Court decision
further refining the permissible reach of state legislation.2 ° Indeed, as this
article was written an Arkansas federal judge2' had issued an order enjoining
17. The Eighth Circuit has disclaimed any view of the test as a "magic formula for
determining preemption," but has acknowledged that it "sets forth an analytical structure for
ERISA preemption claims that facilitates reasoned decision-making and appellate review."
Bannister, 103 F.3d at 636.
18. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645 (1995) (New York Blues). For a thorough and thought-provoking discussion of
the background of the Supreme Court's focus on the broad and common meaning of "relates
to," and its effect on preemption analysis, see generally Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article
About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35 (1996) [hereinafter, The Last Article]. Professor Fisk suggests that
questionable analytical methodology and unfortunate social policy resulted from the Court's
"slavish devotion to literalist textualism in interpreting ERISA's broad preemption provision."
id. at 39.
If that were so, it no longer seems to be the case, as Professor Fisk acknowledges. In
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997),
the court further abandoned the "unhelpful text" of ERISA's preemption provision in favor of
a more refined two-part inquiry: whether the law has express reference to a plan, Id., (citing
District of Columbia v. Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992) (law imposed by
reference to ERISA covered programs is preempted) and Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829-30
(preemption applies to law that excluded ERISA plans by reference to them), or a "reference"
to be inferred from the fact that the existence of an ERISA plan is essential to the very operation
of the law. E.g., Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. 133.
19. Nevertheless, the Court seems inclined to allow lower courts some time in which to
apply its New York Blues framework, and has declined to review an early circuit
court decision preempting a state law imposing any willing provider requirements on ERISA
plans. See CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 387 (1996).
20. See, e.g., California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement, 117 S. Ct. 832 (holding
that state prevailing wage law that neither "made reference to" nor had a connection with
ERISA plan was not preempted).
21. The Hon. James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Arkansas.
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the enforcement portions of Arkansas's Patient Protection Act of 1995,' on the
ground that the state statute was preempted by ERISA;23 by the time the article
is published, the Eighth Circuit may have decided the anticipated appeal in the
case.
II. ERISA'S COMPREHENSIVE MECHANISM
A. Scope of Statute
The emerging preemption issues might be more easily resolved if, as the
title of the statute suggests, Congress had acted only to regulate pension
relationships between employers and employees or their beneficiaries. To the
contrary, ERISA applies broadly to disputes in which employers play no
greater role than facilitating the purchase of insurance by their employees.
24
Indeed, an employer who sponsors insurance can escape the reach of ERISA
only by carefully structuring that benefit so as to minimize its involvement.
26
22. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-201 to -209 (Michie Supp. 1995), popularly known as the
"Any Willing Provider Act").
23. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Medical Ctr., No. LR-C-95-514, order, (E.D.
Ark. Jan. 31, 1997). Plaintiffs in that case filed a complaint in federal court seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of state legislation designed to ensure "that
patients... be given the opportunity to see the health care provider of their choice" by allowing
providers to participate in health benefit plans. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-202 (Michie Supp.
1995). Under the "Any Willing Provider" clause, health insurers were not to impose monetary
advantages or penalties that would affect a beneficiary's choice among providers; insurers were
also prohibited from excluding providers who were willing to accept the health benefit plan's
terms and conditions. The legislature sought to exempt ERISA plans from the effect of the Act,
by providing that it did not apply to "self-funded or other health benefit plans that are exempt
from state regulations by virtue of [ERISA]." Id. § 23-99-209. The district court noted that
preemption applies even when a state's law seeks to single out ERISA plans; in a facially
favorable way, for exclusion from laws of general applicability. Prudential v. Nat'l Park
Medical Ctr., order at 10-11 (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S.
825, 829 (1988)). Applying the standard established by the Eighth Circuit, the district court
concluded that the Any Willing Provider provisions were too strongly connected to ERISA
plans to stand. See also CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.2d 642.
24. It is not necessary that the employer sponsor a detailed or exhaustive plan or program
in order for the employee to bring claims for benefits under ERISA. The statute applies even
if the plan is not written, since the specific reporting and disclosure requirements contained in
the statute impose duties on fiduciaries but do not prevent the existence of a plan. See
Donovan, 688 F.2d at 1372. See also Robinson v. Linomaz 58 F.3d 365 (8th Cir. 1995).
25. The Department of Labor has promulgated regulations setting forth a "safe harbor"
in the form of a test which, if met in every respect, provides a strong indication that insurance
purchased in connection with the workplace is not an employee welfare benefit plan:
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" shall not include a
group or group-type insurance program offered by an insurer to employers ...
under which
(1) No contributions are made by an employer or employee organization;
1997]
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B. Written Plans as Source of Rights
Congress envisioned that every employee benefit plan would be
established and maintained pursuant to a written plan.27 This, the Supreme
Court has explained, is one of ERISA's "core functional requirements. '' 28 The
Congressional emphasis on the written plan has sometimes been regarded as
irreconcilable with common law principles such as equitable estoppel, by
which parties may negate the express terms of instruments through their
conduct. 29 Even such well-entrenched legal doctrines as contra proferentem
(2) Participation in the program is completely voluntary for employees or
members;
(3) The sole functions of the employer or employee organization with respect
to the program are... to permit the insurer to publicize the program .... to collect
premiums .... and to remit them to the insurer; and
(4) The employer or employee organization receives no consideration in the
form of cash or otherwise in connection with the program[.]
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(0) (1996). The insurance purchase is not exempt from ERISA
unless all four of these standards are met. See, e.g., Gahn v. Allstate Life Ins. Co.,
926 F.2d 1449, 1452 (5th Cir. 1991); Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins.
Co., 904 F.2d 236, 243 (5th Cir. 1990).
26. See Donovan, 688 F.2d at 1370. The question of whether the individual seeking
benefits is actually an employee may be a critical one, to be resolved under general common
law principles. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (summary judgment
in favor of company on ground that agent was an independent contractor, as determined by
application of traditional agency principles, including the following: the hiring party's right to
control the manner and means by which the project was accomplished; the skill required; the
source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the
relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party had the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long
to work; the method of payment; the hired party['s] role in hiring and paying assistants; whether
the work was part of the hiring party's regular business; whether the hiring party was in
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment).
As new workplace issues emerge from the growing use of leased employees and
independent contractors, courts will be called upon to make more determinations about the
existence of a benefit plan in the context of nontraditional hiring relationships. See, e.g.,
Viscaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs were common
law employees entitled to participate in benefit plans although their relationship with the plan
sponsor had been described in agreements as that of independent contractors).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(l).
28. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995). "In the words of the key
congressional report, '[a] written plan is to be required in order that every employee may, on
examining the plan documents, determine exactly what his rights and obligations are under the
plan."' Id. (citation omitted). The statute and the regulations promulgated under it require plan
administrators to give every new participant in the plan a Summary Plan Description (SPD)
setting forth the terms of the plan. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(b)(1)(A), 1021 (a)(1), 1022(a)(1). When
new employees receive an SPD, it must be accompanied by any summaries of material
modifications or changes that have not yet been incorporated into the SPD. 29 C.F.R.
§ 2520.104b-3(c) (1996).
29. See, e.g., Weber v. St. Louis Univ., 6 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 1993) (estoppel
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may yield to the emphasis on plan language, as shaped by the regulatory
scheme requiring use of terms in their ordinary meaning.30 There are many
other requirements,31 some of which support the view that Congress intended
to regulate comprehensively the benefits aspects of private contracts for
employment within the states.
32
C. Effect on Litigation
1. Causes ofAction.
In section 502 of ERISA Congress provided six specific mechanisms for
enforcement of the rights created under the Act. Participants and
beneficiaries 33 were authorized to sue among other things, to (1) recover
benefits due under the terms of a plan, (2) enforce rights under the plan, and (3)
clarify their right to future benefits.34 A participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or
the Secretary of Labor can sue for appropriate relief against one has who
breached any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed on
fiduciaries by ERISA.35
In section 502(a)(3),36 Congress authorized actions for certain kinds of
equitable relief, including an injunction against an act or practice that violates
principles unavailable to contradict express plan terms).
30. Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1990).
31. For example, under ERISA the SPD must be written in a manner meant to be
understood by the average plan participant; it must be accurate and reasonably comprehensive.
29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1). Federal regulations prohibit the distribution of an SPD whose format
has the effect of misleading, misinforming, or failing to inform participants and beneficiaries.
29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(b) (1996). Any exceptions, limitations, reductions and restrictions
applicable to benefits may not be minimized or rendered obscure through their description. Id.
32. Although Congress elected not to require any particular type of benefit in plans subject
to ERISA, it included in the legislation carefully drawn provisions giving plan participants the
right to obtain information about their benefits. An administrator who fails to comply with a
participant's request for information that must be made available under the statute may be
personally liable to the participant or beneficiary for an amount of up to $100.00 per day. 29
U.S.C. § 1132(c).
33. Only a participant or beneficiary may bring a civil enforcement action under Section
502(a)(1). A participant or beneficiary is someone who "is or may become eligible to receive
a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan": 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7)-(8). The term
"participant" covers former employees who reasonably expect to return to covered employment
or who have a colorable claim for vested benefits. Adamson v. Armco, Inc., 44 F.3d 650, 654
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 85 (1995) (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 117-18 (1989)). Moreover, if the loss of participant status is a result of the fiduciary's
alleged ERISA violation, the former participant has standing to challenge the fiduciary
violation. Id. at 654-55; Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
34. 29 U.S.C. § l132(a)(1)(B).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
1997]
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ERISA or the terms of the plan, or for "appropriate equitable relief' to (1)
redress violations of the statute or plan or (2) enforce the plan or the provisions
of ERISA. An employee benefit plan may be sued, or sue, as an entity."
Under section 510 of ERISA,38 employers may not discriminate or take
other adverse action against individuals 39 for exercising their ERISA rights.4"
The prohibition also applies to interfering with the attainment of ERISA rights,
and to retaliation against those who have given information or testified in any
proceeding under the statute.
Plan assets such as pension plan funds and employee stock ownership plan
funds must be held in trust, and are not to inure to the benefit of the employer.41
Fiduciaries are charged with adherence to a "[p]rudent man standard of care,'1 2
avoiding participation in or knowing concealment of impropriety by other
fiduciaries, and eschewing prohibited transactions, such as those with a party
in interest.
43
ERISA does not provide employees or their beneficiaries a right to any
particular welfare benefits. When an employer acts in its capacity as settlor, or
creator of the plan, it may adopt or amend the plan without regard for the best
interests of participants."
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1). Any money judgment obtained under Section 502 against the
employee benefit plan is enforceable against the plan only, and not against any other person.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. The section provides as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any
person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or
beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of [a plan, the
Act, or certain other provisions of federal law]." Id.
39. An interesting aspect of section 510 litigation is the requirement that a person have
"standing" in order to bring a claim; that is, he or she must be a participant or beneficiary of a
plan. When workers have been discharged, the question arises as to whether they have a
reasonable expectation of receiving benefits under the plan. See, e.g., Shahid v. Ford Motor
Co., 67 F.3d 1404 (6th Cir. 1996); Fleming v. Ayers & Assocs., 948 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1991)
(woman hired one day and fired, allegedly in an effort to avoid high medical costs associated
with her child, was a participant with standing to sue for discrimination in provision of
benefits); Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983) (discharge by employer
to avoid high costs of benefits for employee's benefits was actionable).
40. The evidentiary framework under section 510 mirrors that applicable to Title VII and
Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA) cases. Kinkhead v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
49 F.3d 454, 456 (8th Cir. 1995) (if claimant can establish prima facie case of violation of
section 510, burden shifts to employer to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action; if this is done, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show offered reason was pretextual);
accord, Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1988).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1103.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
44. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. 73. An employer may unilaterally modify or terminate
benefits. John Morrell & Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l, 37 F.3d 1302, 1303-
04 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.. 2251 (1995). See also Ravenscraft v. Hy-Vee
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2. Equitable Nature ofActions.
The rights and remedies arising under ERISA are rooted in the equitable
law of trusts. Thus, it is widely held that no right to jury trial exists under the
statute, and trial of an ERISA case to a jury can constitute reversible error.45
Furthermore, the legal remedy of punitive damages does not fit within the
equitable scheme chosen by Congress. 6
3. Standard of Review.
The proper standard for judicial review of benefit determinations under
ERISA turns on the language of the document establishing the employee
benefit plan. 7 If the plan document gives discretionary authority to the plan
administrator or other fiduciary to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the plan's terms, the fiduciary's decisions must be reviewed under a
deferential standard; if there is no language granting discretion, review is de
novo.48 A court may overturn a fiduciary's discretionary decision in such
circumstances only if the claimant demonstrates an abuse of that discretion.4
Employee Benefit Plan & Trust, 85 F.3d 398 (8th Cir. 1996) (ERISA did not provide continued
right to plan benefits formerly available).
45. Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing and remanding
judgment on jury verdict where district court declined to make precautionary findings and
conclusions). "The Supreme Court's decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs, 508 U.S. 248
(1993) confirms that there is no right to money damages or a jury trial under ERISA." Id.
ERISA displaces state common law with a comprehensive set of federal remedies, all of which
are equitable in nature. See Kirk v. Provident Life & Accident, 942 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 199 1)
(no Seventh Amendment right to jury trial under ERISA) (citing In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318
(8th Cir. 1982)).
46. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (punitive damages
and extracontractual damages not available for benefit denial claims under ERISA).
47. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108-09 (1989).
48. Id. at 115. Appellate courts apply de novo review to the district court's application
of deferential review. E.g., Maune v. International Bd. of Elec. Workers, 83 F.3d 959, 962 (8th
Cir. 1996).
49. See Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1996); Cox v. Mid-America
Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 571 (8th Cir. 1992) (Cox 1), aff'd after remand, 13 F.3d 272 (8th
Cir. 1993) (Cox I). In Donaho, the court surveyed various formulations of the discretionary
standard employed by Eighth Circuit panels, noting that the court has looked to a substantial
evidence standard, Donaho, 74 F.3d at 898 (citing Short v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas
Pension Fund, 729 F.2d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 1984)), has required that the decision be
"reasonable," Id. (citing Cox II, 13 F.3d at 274), and has upheld decisions that were
characterized as not "'extraordinarily imprudent or extremely unreasonable,"' Id. (citing
Licktieg v. Business Men's Assurance Co. of Am., 61 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir. 1995)). Writing
for the Donaho panel, Senior Circuit Judge Myron H. Bright observed that the last of these
formulations should be viewed as an example of abuse of discretion, and not as a threshold for
review. Id. at 898-99. The proper standard was merely one of reasonableness, as reflected by
substantial evidence to support the fiduciary's decision. In determining whether a decisive
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This deferential standard "does not permit a reviewing court to reject a
discretionary trustee decision with which the court simply disagrees."5 °
Typical insurance policy language, however, does not give rise to deferential
review.51
4. Unique Evidentiary Rules.
The applicable standard impacts the admissibility of evidence at trial as
well. 2 When the deferential standard applies, the court ordinarily refuses to
consider materials that were not presented to the claim administrator. 3
When the plan documents do not support deferential review, the trial court
may for good cause shown, "allow the parties to introduce evidence in addition
to that presented to the fiduciary" if necessary for adequate de novo review. 4
interpretation of plan language or terms is reasonable, the Eighth Circuit applies the five-factor
test outlined in Finley v. Special Agents Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 957 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1992) (in
determining whether plan decision is reasonable court considers 1) whether fiduciary's
interpretation is consistent with the goals of plan; 2) whether the interpretation renders any
language in plan meaningless or internally inconsistent; 3) whether fiduciary's interpretation
conflicts with substantive or procedural requirements of ERISA; 4) whether fiduciary has
interpreted relevant term consistently; and 5) whether interpetation is contrary to the clear
language of the plan).
50. Donaho, 74 F.3d at 898 (quoting Cox 1, 965 F.2d at 572). Furthermore, the court is
not to substitute its own weighing of conflicting evidence for that of the body given discretion.
Faced with a record that supports both parties' positions, the court cannot find the fiduciary's
decision arbitrary or capricious. Collins v. Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare
Fund, 18 F.3d 556, 560 (8th Cir. 1994).
51. Ravenscraft, 85 F.3d 398, 402 n.2. See also Bounds v. Bell At. Enters. Flexible
Long-Term Disability Plan, 32 F.3d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1994).
52. See Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993) (appropriate
standard affects evidence admissible and legal analysis applied).
53. Id. at 765 n.2.
54. Id. at 763. Furthermore, if the fiduciary fails or refuses to decide a claim, the district
court may address benefits issues de novo, deciding the case on a "somewhat expanded" factual
basis. Mansker v. TMG, 54 F.3d 1322 (8th Cir. 1995).
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5. Exhaustion of Remedies.
Although nothing in the language of the statute requires it,55 many courts
have interpreted Congressional intent to favor exhaustion of administrative
remedies as a prerequisite to bringing a claim for benefits. Failure to exhaust
appeal procedures outlined in a plan can result in dismissal of the benefit claim
in federal court. 6
6. Fee-Shifting.
Although ERISA preempts state laws regarding fee-shifting, the statute
contains its own provisions for award of fees to either party."
IIL. EVOLUTION OF PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
A. Text of Section 514
In section 514, Congress directed that the statute was to "supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan."58 By means of a saving clause, Congress excepted from the
statute's preemptive sweep those laws that regulate insurance, banking, and
55. See Conley v. Pitney Bowes, 34 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 1994) (judicially created
exhaustion requirements may advance goals of ERISA, but need not be applied in case where
fiduciary has failed to inform beneficiary of procedures for appeal of decision). As the court
acknowledged, the doctrine is broadly regarded as serving important purposes in ERISA. Id.
at 718 (citing Constantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 975 (6th Cir. 1994) (exhaustion
requirement (1) reduces frivolous lawsuits; (2) promotes consistent treatment of claimants; (3)
provides non-adversarial means of claims settlement; (4) minimizes costs of claims resolution
for all parties; (5) enhances the ability of fiduciaries efficiently to manage plans by preventing
premature judicial intervention; (6) gives fiduciaries a chance to correct their errors, or to
convince disappointed benefit seekers that they are incorrect; (7) enhances the ability of the
fiduciary to interpret plan provisions; and (8) helps assemble a record that will assist the court
in reviewing the fiduciary's actions).
56. Southwestern Bell, Ill F.3d 67. See also Kevin D. Hart, Annotation, Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies as Prerequisite to Suit Under Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1001 et seq.), 54 A.L.R. FED 364 (1981).
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g). International Bd. of Elec. Workers, 85 F.3d 959, 963 (to
determine whether award of fees to prevailing party is warranted, court should consider (1)
degree of culpability or bad faith assigned to opposing party; (2) opposing party's ability to
pay; (3) potential for deterring others in similar circumstances; (4) whether the moving party
sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries or resolve a significant legal question
regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties' positions) (citing Mansker v. TMG
Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322, 1329 (8th Cir. 1995) and Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 749 F.2d 494,
495-96 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
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securities.59 The preemption framework is completed by a deemer clause, in
which Congress made clear that state laws purportedly regulating insurance
may not deem an employee benefit plan to be an insurance company.'
1. Indicia of Congressional Purpose.
Although the Supreme Court paused in New York Blues to acknowledge
the difficulty of applying a true "relates to" test when "'really, universally,
relations stop nowhere,''" it is not as if the remarkable breadth of the "relates
to" language in ERISA's preemption clause occurred only recently to the
Court. Rather, the potentially limitless sweep of the phrase was seen for years
as a reflection of Congressional intent to forestall intentional or inadvertent
interference by states in a delicately balanced scheme designed to benefit
employees by carefully regulating benefit plans while encouraging employers
to adopt and maintain fair plans.
Thus, courts have variously explained Congress' adoption of a preemption
rule that the Supreme Court has characterized as "deliberatively expansive"62
and "conspicuous for its breadth."6 3 Most commonly, the explanation reflects
the Supreme Court's observation that ERISA's comprehensive set of
remedies' would make little sense if states could adopt contrary or conflicting
remedies.65
2. Effect of Regulatory Scheme.
The preemption principles emanating from the Supreme Court's pension
cases are quite strong and relatively clear, since Congress has supplied its own
thorough regulatory mechanism that displaces state attempts to regulate in a
concrete way the law of pensions.' There has been little challenge to the view
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
61. 115 S. Ct. at 1677 (quoting H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed., WORLD
CLASSICS (1980)).
62. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46.
63. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,58 (1990).
64. "The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of the
statute as finally enacted... provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize
other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly." Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985).
65. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54 ("The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain
remedies and the exclusion of others would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan
participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress
rejected in ERISA."); see also Mohamed v. Kerr, 53 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 1995).
66. Particularly with respect to pensions, ERISA is a "comprehensive and reticulated
statute." Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981) (quoting Nachman
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that Congress "meant to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a
federal concern.,
67
As in the case of pension plans, in the context of employee welfare benefit
plans, the Supreme Court in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux 6g had little
trouble discerning a clear Congressional intent to preempt the field in favor of
federal regulation, thereby completely preventing the possibility of contrary or
inconsistent state law regulation.69 The claim at issue was brought by a worker
whose long term disability benefits were terminated after he received them for
two years following a back injury at work. Over the next three years, Pilot Life
terminated and reinstated the benefits several times.70
Finding the claim preempted, the Court observed that there could be no
dispute that the common law causes of action asserted in the complaint "related
to" an employee welfare benefit plan so that the plaintiff's claims brought
under the Mississippi law of first party bad faith by an insurance company were
preempted.
Except as to the claims of employees and their beneficiaries for specific
benefits,72 preemption rules operate with less certainty outside the realm of
pension rights, since Congress has not crafted an extensive regulatory scheme
with which to displace state law.73 ERISA does impose administrative
responsibilities on plan sponsors and others,74 but apart from concerns imposed
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
67. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 523. In Alessi, the court held that Congress articulated its reasoning
for expansive pension regulation in its statement of findings and declaration of policy: "despite
the enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of employment are losing
anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a). ERISA supplies vesting and accrual standards, Id. § § 1053-1054, minimum rules
for employee participation, Id., § 1051, fiduciary standards, id., § 1081-1085, fiduciary
standards for those who control plan assets, id., § § 1101-1114, and an insurance program in
the event of plan termination, Id., § 1341-1348. See Alessi, 451 U.S. 510-11 & n.5. In Alessi
the Court held that a New Jersey statute prohibiting the offset of workers' compensation
benefits against pension benefits was preempted by ERISA. Justice Marshall, writing for a
unanimous Court, mentioned "respect for the separate spheres of governmental authority
preserved in our federalist system," 451 U.S. at 522, but concluded that the state law was an
"impermissible intrusion on the federal regulatory scheme," Id. at 525, in that it forbade a
method of calculating benefits that Congress meant to permit.
68. 481 U.S. 41,46 (1987).
69. Id. (citing 120 CONG. REc. 29,197, 29933 (1974) (remarks of Senator Williams
regarding Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. In the last decade, courts and counsel have grown accustomed to the fact that ERISA
preempts contract claims for benefits brought by employees against the companies that supply
insurance. See, e.g., Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 875 (1987) (state contract
claim to recover benefits under employee welfare plan clearly preempted).
73. See generally, The Last Article, supra note 18.
74. See supra notes 29 & 33.
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by other state and federal laws7" those who draft plans are free to include or
reject various species of benefits and limitations as they please. Moreover,
although the statute does impose certain fiduciary duties on those who have
particular roles in deciding claims,76 it is unclear whether an action for breach
of this duty would provide any basis for a claim based on denial of benefits.77
B. Species of Preemption
In the context of removal of purported state law claims, the preemption
analysis is critically shaped by the "well-pleaded complaint" rule.78 If no
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs' properly pleaded
complaint, removal is proper only if federal law completely displaces the field
of state law actions so that any claim of the kind governed by federal law is
completely displaced. Unless this is so, the statutory preemption language of
section 514 provides a mere affirmative defense that is not present on the face
of the complaint. Such defenses are insufficient to warrant removal to federal
court.79 The removing party must show that "'Congress has so completely pre-
75. See, e.g., Henderson v. Bodine Alum., Inc., 70 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
(enjoining as violation of Americans with Disabilities Act a benefit plan's decision to treat high
dose chemotherapy treatment for breast cancer as a procedure that was not accepted for the
disease and therefore not covered by the plan, while treating the same procedure as accepted
treatment for other kinds of cancer).
76. A person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent he or she (1) has
discretionary authority or control in the management of the plan or disposition of its assets; (2)
renders investment advice for a fee; or (3) has any discretionary authority or responsibility for
plan administration. ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21). The test is functional, and one may
be a fiduciary for some purposes but not others. E.g., Kerns v. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 992 F.2d
214 (8th Cir. 1993). An insurer is a fiduciary if it has authority to grant, deny, or review claims.
Robinson v. Linomaz, 58 F.3d 365 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995). Under typical circumstances, third-
party administrators are unlikely to be found to be fiduciaries, if they have no power to make
the final decision regarding claims. See also, Wesley Kobylak, Annotation, Who is
"Fiduciary" within meaning of 3(21) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)), 67 A.L.R. FED. 186 (1984). The Department of Labor has issued
Interpretative Bulletins addressing fiduciary status. See generally 29 C.F.R. 2509, 75-8 (1974).
77. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (noting statutory
provisions that fiduciary who breaches duty must make good "to such plan any losses to the
plan" and restore "to such plan" any profits made through loss of plan assets). More recently,
however, the Supreme Court has held that fiduciary duties may be enforced through Section
502(a)(3), which allows actions for "appropriate equitable relief" to enforce plan terms, and
such relief may include reinstatement to coverage under a benefit plan. Howe v. Varity Corp.,
116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996), aff'g 36 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1994).
78. E.g., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom,
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Dukes, 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987)). The rule describes the basic boundaries of federal question
jurisdiction. Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63.
79. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63; Dukes, 57 F.3d at 353.
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empt[ed] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of
claims is necessarily federal in character.' ''
"When the doctrine of complete preemption does not apply, but the
plaintiff's state claim is arguably preempted [by the 'relates to' language of 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a)], the district court, being without removal jurisdiction, cannot
resolve the dispute regarding preemption."'" Thus, the district court lacks
power to do anything other than remand to state court, where the preemption
issue, if properly raised, can be resolved. 2
Generally when the limits of section 514 "relates to" preemption have
been raised, federal courts have rejected that provision as grounds for removal
unless the claim is one that actually is best characterized as one that would fall
within the scope of ERISA's specific remedies.
8 3
C. Retreat from "Relates to" Analysis
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co.,8 the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a
challenge to a New York statute that required hospitals to collect surcharges
from patients covered by certain third party health providers, but not from
patients covered by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan. Seemingly signaling a turn
away from a focus on whether the state law merely "relates to" a plan in the
sense of having any "connection" or "reference" to an ERISA plan, the Court
acknowledged that such considerations do "not give much help in drawing the
line" between state laws that survive preemption and those that are displaced.85
"If 'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy,
then for all practical purposes preemption would never run its course, for
'[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere."'' 86 For the first time, the Court
read the "relates to" language as Congress' imposition of a limitation on the
sweep of preemption, and looked instead to the scope of state law Congress
80. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 354 (quoting Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63-64).
81. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355.
82. Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 4
(1983)).
83. Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d at 639 (Section 514 creates "conflict" preemption and does
not support removal); Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531, 534 (6th Cir. 1995) (Section
514(a) does not create federal cause of action); Brown v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 934
F.2d 1193, 1996 (11 th Cir. 1991) ("super preemption" required in order to give court ERISA
removal jurisdiction over well-pleaded state law complaint).
84. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
85. Id. at 1677.
86. Id. (quoting H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed., WORLD'S CLASSICS
(1980)).
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must have expected would survive the enactment of ERISA.87 Specifically,
the Court held that in light of the long held understanding that preemption
analysis begins with "the starting assumption that Congress does not intend to
supplant state law,"" indirect economic impact from legislation on ERISA
plans is not reason enough to believe that Congress meant to nullify such laws.
The Supreme Court's disenchantment with application of a literal "relates
to" test as a guide in preemption analysis became further evident in its February
1997 decision in California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Construction, N.A. 89 The case involved a California prevailing
wage law that required contractors on public works projects to pay workers the
prevailing wage in the workers' locale, except that a lower wage could be paid
to workers in an approved apprenticeship program. The Court held that ERISA
did not preempt the law to the extent that it forbade payment of apprentice
wages to apprentices in unapproved programs. After concluding that the
California law did not "make reference to ERISA plans,"9 the Court noted that
the wage regulation was a traditional area of state concern as to which ERISA
had little to say.9' Since the prevailing wage statute altered the incentives
affecting ERISA plans but did not dictate their choices, it was "no different
from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to local regulation, which
Congress could not possibly have intended to eliminate. 92
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, would have gone even further,
proposing in his concurring opinion that the Court acknowledge that the
"'relates to' project was doomed to failure," since it provided no real measure
of Congressional intent or framework for discerning analysis, and that the
criteria that evolved around that standard "have been abandoned. 93 Justice
Scalia would undertake ERISA preemption analysis within the framework of
"ordinary field preemption" and "ordinary conflict preemption" as applied to
other questions of the supremacy of federal law. "Nothing more mysterious
than that; and except as establishing that," Scalia wrote, "'relates to' is
irrelevant.,
94
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1676.
89. 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997).
90. Id. at 838.
91. Id. at 840.
92. Id. at 842 (quoting New York Blues, 115 S. Ct. at 1673).
93. 117 S. Ct. at 843 (Scalia, J., concurring).
94. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248
(1984) (explaining that preemption can occur when Congress has either (1) evidenced an intent
to occupy an entire field, or (2) entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question
to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law.)).
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D. The Multi-Factor Test: Specific Impact
This we know of Congressional intent: section 514 was meant to prevent
states from imposing varying obligations on ERISA plans in ways that might
discourage or limit adoption of such plans, to the detriment of employees.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit's multi-factor test-with its focus on impact on the
plan, its entities, and its administration--seems appropriately directed toward
discarding the confusion of "relates to" analysis in favor of an examination in
each case of the core of Congressional concern.
"[T]he six factors are not themselves a magic formula."95 They serve
instead to focus a reviewing court's attention on
the totality of the state [law's] impact on the plan: (1) whether the state law
negates a plan provision; (2) the effect on primary ERISA entities; (3) the
impact on plan administration; (4) the economic impact on the plan; (5)
whether ERISA is consistent with other provisions of ERISA; and (6)
whether the state law at issue is an exercise of traditional state power."
96
It seems as well that impact, like relationships, can be relative. While one
should resist the tendency to distill analyses to ever more terse formulas
expressed in shorthand terms, it is useful to understand that common law that
imposes duties, rather than mere cost choices among legally acceptable
alternatives, is most at risk of preemption. An impact of this kind will almost
always lead to a finding of preemption.
This is so even though the claim may not constitute the sort of direct
request for plan benefits that lies at the pole of plain preemption. The
fiduciary's unfavorable decision sometimes marks the beginning, rather than
the denouement, of a beneficiary's otherwise legally cognizable injury.
Accordingly, courts have been called upon to address actions for wrongful
death, emotional distress, indirect financial loss, and exacerbation of physical
injury claimed to have been legally caused by administrative choices within the
framework of a benefit plan. Plaintiffs generally have not been successful in
seeking to avoid preemption of actions against plans for their roles in
utilization review or benefit-denial decisions even when the plans seem to have
caused or contributed to injury. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Kuhl v.
Lincoln National Health Plan97 is illustrative. After Buddy Kuhl suffered a
95. Bannister, 103 F.3d at 636.
96. Id. (quoting Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 947 F.2d at 1345). In some
formulations, the Court has inserted as the third of seven factors consideration of whether the
state law impacts the structure of ERISA plans.
97. 999 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1993). For a thorough discussion of the interplay between
healthcare delivery systems and various liability theories, see generally, Brian P. Battaglia, The
Shift Toward Managed Care and Emerging Utilization Management and Financial Incentive
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heart attack, his physicians recommended prompt open heart surgery to
alleviate a "high risk of sudden death. 'g Doctors at the Kansas City hospital
where Kuhl was being treated determined that they did not have the equipment
for the procedures Kuhl needed, and recommended that the operation be
performed at Barnes Hospital in St. Louis.99 The procedure was scheduled for
July 6, 1989, at Barnes Hospital. On June 23, 1989, Lincoln National refused
to precertify payment for the surgery because Barnes was out of its service
area. The July surgery was canceled, and by the time Lincoln National
determined in July that it would pay for the treatment, the surgery team at
Barnes had become unavailable until September. Early in September, Kuhl's
doctors discovered that his heart had deteriorated to such an extent that the
surgery no longer was a viable option. Kuhl was placed on a heart transplant
waiting list, but died in December 1989.
Addressing the district court's dismissal of the ensuing suit by the Kuhl
family, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court's decisions
did not "provide a clear-cut method for determining whether a state law which
merely has some unintended effects on ERISA-governed plans will be
preempted."' ° Nevertheless, the court presaged its coming focus on duty-
based specific impact in the common law context when it noted no difference
between Lincoln National's admitted cancellation'0 ' of the surgery and its
"decision not to precertify payment [which] relates directly to Lincoln
National's administration of benefits."' 2
Claims based on delay in approving treatment,0 3 withholding of
recommended equipment,'04 hospitalization or services,' termination of
Arrangements Between Healthcare Providers and Payers, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 155
(1997).
98. 999 F.2d at 300.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 302.
101. The defendant admitted, apparently in an inadvertent response or lack of response to
the filing by plaintiffs of a set of facts claimed not to be in dispute, that it had "canceled" the
surgery. Id.
102. Id. at 303. Notably, the Court did not believe that the fact that the alleged wrong
involves precertification necessarily would result in preemption in every case. The court mused
that a state law claim might have survived if the facts had shown that the cancellation of the
surgery or the delay in treatment had caused Kuhl to miss an opportunity for surgery for which
he was prepared to pay. Id.
103. See, e.g., Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., I I F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993) (claim preempted
where treating doctor believed autologous bone marrow treatment for testicular cancer was
necessary, but window of opportunity for such procedure passed while plan reconsidered its
refusal to pay), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1612 (1994).
104. E.g., Elsesser v. Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, 802 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir.
1992) (HMO decision not to pay for heart monitor).
105. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.) (suit against utilization
review provider following refusal to precertify expectant mother's hospitalization for high-risk
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coverage, °6 refusal to refer to a specialist, 0 7 refusal to authorize psychiatric
treatment,' ° or selection of facilities,0 9 have been held preempted. Similarly,
lower courts often have declined to allow state law actions based on the
asserted negligence of managed care organizations in choosing or supervising
health care providers. "O
The Eighth Circuit's recent opinion in Shea v. Esensten"' provides
another guidepost. Although clearly disturbed at the defendant's alleged
conduct of failing to reveal to a participant the serious financial incentives
affecting his primary care physician's decision not to refer him to a cardiolo-
gist,1 2 the court noted that "claims of misconduct against the administrator of
an employer's health plan fall comfortably within ERISA's broad preemption
provision.""' Applying the multi-factor test, the court concluded that the
"outcome of [the plaintiffs] lawsuit would clearly affect how [the employer's]
ERISA-regulated benefit plan is administered, and if similar cases are brought
across the country, ERISA plan administrators will inevitably be forced to
tailor their plan disclosures to meet each state's unique requirements." H4 Such
a result, the court reasoned, would plainly interfere with the uniform adminis-
tration of plans."15
The result in Shea signals that the future of preemption analysis may be
shaped as well by emerging notions of the remedies available under ERISA.
The court's inquiry did not end with a finding of preemption; the plaintiff had
charged the IMO with a breach of its fiduciary duty to the participant, and the
pregnancy) cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 812 (1992).
106. Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505 (10th Cir. 1991) (allegation that
depression over retroactive termination of life insurance brought about heart attack was
preempted by ERISA).
107. Rodriquez v. Pacificare of Texas, Inc., 980 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1993).
108. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995).
109. Dearmas v. A.V. Med, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
110. See, e.g., Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical Serv., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md.
1994); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
111. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
112. After experiencing chest pains, Patrick Shea made several visits to his family doctor.
"Despite all the warning signs," id. at 626, the physician stated that referral to a cardiologist
was unnecessary for his forty-year-old patient. Id. When Shea offered to pay for the
cardiologist himself, the doctor persuaded him that he was too young and did not have enough
symptoms to justify the visit. Id. Months later, Shea died of heart failure. Id. According to
his widow's complaint, Shea did not know that his HMO's contract with the physician rewarded
doctors for not making covered referrals, and that primary care doctors were docked a portion
of their fees if they made too many such referrals. Id. at 627. The plaintiff alleged that if her
husband had known this, he would have disregarded his physician's advice and would have
seen a cardiologist at his own expense. Id.
113. Id. at 627 (citing Kuhl, 999 F.2d 298, 301-04).
114. Shea, 107 F.3d at 627.
115. Id.
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court agreed that the plaintiff had stated a claim for breach of the duty to deal
fairly and honestly with plan members by disclosing material information. 1
16
The court declined to address issues about what remedies, if any, might be
available to the plaintiff, since those matters were not addressed by the district
court.1
17
The importance of the shift away from a focus on the existence of
relationships toward an evaluation of the specific types of impact on plan
administration or plan entities is well illustrated by the different outcomes of
two lawsuits arising from the same denial of medical benefits under a group
policy purchased by Candace Wilson's employer. Wilson first sued in state
court in Missouri. After removing the case to federal court, defendant
Prudential Insurance Company obtained summary judgment based on the terms
of the exclusion in its policy applicable to expenses that were, or could have
been, covered by workers' compensation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed." 8 In
a subsequent action, however, the appellate court reversed a summary
judgment in favor of the Prudential agent who sold the policy to Wilson's
employer, holding that Wilson could proceed with her state law claim of
negligent misrepresentation against the agent." 9 Since the state law had no
implied or express reference to ERISA plans, the court applied the multi-factor
test for the totality of the circumstances constituting any "connection" between
the law and the plan. Although Wilson's suit against the agent seemingly did
"relate to" her employer's welfare benefit plan, the Eighth Circuit noted that
the action did not seek benefits under the employer's plan, and it did not affect
relations between ERISA entities, impact plan structure, or affect plan
administration. 20 In a significant aspect of the latter determination, the court
characterized the agent's alleged misrepresentation as "pre-plan tortious
conduct" of a type that would not impose new duties on plan administrators.
Had the alleged tort occurred during the course of plan administration, it seems
the preemption calculus would be altered, even for a claim solely against the
insurance company agent. 2'
116. Id.at 628.
117. The plaintiff's victory might have been an empty one, if only traditional equitable
relief, and not damages, are available for breach of fiduciary duty. See supra note 78.
118. Wilson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1996). Four circuit judges voted
to grant Wilson's petition for rehearing with suggestion of rehearing in banc.
119. Wilson v. Zoellner, 114 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 1997).
120. Id. at 718-719.
121. The court was untroubled by the possibility that Prudential might be obliged to
indemnify Zoellner, and thus could be liable in its capacity as the employer of a tortfeasor, since
"Prudential will not be liable in any way for its administration of an ERISA plan, but rather for
the coincidental and unrelated conduct of its agent." Id. at 718.
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The Eighth Circuit's decision in In Home Health, Inc. v. The Prudential
Insurance Co.122 represents an important application of the multi-factor
preemption test to claims arising from representations regarding the limits of
plan benefits. It seems likely that under an expansive "relates to" analysis,
such claims would be preempted, since the validity of the claim could not be
determined without reference to the plan. Applying the multifactor test,
however, the Eighth Circuit held that this connection was not controlling,
because the health care provider's claim that an insurer had negligently
represented that a benefit limit had not been reached was not based on the
provider's assignment of rights by the participant. 23 Thus, allowance of the
claim would not negate a plan provision by allowing greater benefits than the
plan provided.'24 The court also found that allowing the claim would not
impose additional administrative requirements on the insurer, an ERISA entity,
because it would be free in the future to decline to respond to inquiries about
benefit limits.125 Even if it chose to respond, it would only be required to
perform a bookkeeping function, not change its procedures for administering
claims. 126  This distinguished the case from Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, in which the assignment statute at issue would have forced the
administrator to alter the way in which it processed claims and "would have
imposed significant administrative burdens on the administrator in determining
whether a beneficiary had assigned his or her benefits to a health care
provider."' 12
7
122. 101 F.3d 600 (8th Cir. 1996).
123. Id. Courts regularly view the claims of providers who have been misled about the
benefits available as distinct from the claims asserted by participants who have been similarly
misled. Recovery for the former species of claims does not, in a sense, result in greater benefits
being provided under the plan, since the duty to make good for the representation derives from
the plan terms or administration, despite its connection to those matters. See, e.g., The
Meadows v. Employers Health Ins., 47 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 1995); Lordmann Enterprises,
Inc. v. Equicor, Inc., 32 F.3d 1529, 1533 (11 th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 335 (1995);
Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins. of Okla., Inc., 944 F.2d 752, 756 (10th Cir.
1991); and Memorial Hosp. System v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 250 (5th Cir.
1990). Contra, Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1991),
cert. dismissed, 113 S. CT. 2 (1992).
124. In Home Health, 101 F.3d 600. ERISA generally preempts claims seeking greater or
different benefits based on misrepresentations or fraud concerning plan provisions. See, e.g.,
Pohl v. National Benefit Consultants, Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1992); Smith v. Dunham-
Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1992); Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1011 (1990); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1989).
125. In Home Health, 101 F.3d at 606.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 606. Although the claim against an ERISA entity arising from actions it took
in the course of plan duties was not preempted, it is unclear whether the Eighth Circuit would
align with those courts holding that claims arising from common law related to corporate duties
may not be preempted, if the impact on plan entities is not strong. Cf Williams v. Cypert, 708
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IV. CONCLUSION
Between the poles of claims for benefits on one hand and state legislation
that has only indirect economic impact on ERISA plans on the other hand lie
a species of claims that in some sense "relate to" employee benefit claims; they
may require a reference to the plan for resolution or calculation of damages, or
they may be connected with the plan in some other manner. If analyzing these
cases in light of any relationship or connection to plans is, as Justice Scalia
suggests, a doomed exercise, then multifactor tests can help courts make
decisions based on the specific types of impact visited on plan terms and
administration by the common law at issue and thus may dominate ongoing
preemption analysis as to these claims.
F. Supp. 229,231 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (no preemption of state claims connected to ERISA plan
when allegation is that defendants have breached a state law duty arising from their separate
capacities as officers and directors of a corporation) (citing Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee
Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1468 (5th Cir. 1986)). See also
Richmond v. American Sys. Corp., 792 F. Supp. 449, 458 (E.D. Va. 1992) (law governing
corporations is quintessentially the province of traditional state authority and should not be
displaced when dispute only incidentally implicates ERISA plan). Even if such suits alleging
breach of corporate law duties are preempted, it is unlikely that the complete preemption exists
to justify removal in the face of the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Constantine v. Minis, 910
F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
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